(10119 words including references and notes) Why do major economic powers seek more and more free trade agreements (FTAs) with smaller partners? Recently, Japan has joined the bandwagon by signing its first bilateral FTA. The decision, highly contested domestically, represents a sea change in Japanese trade policy and a challenging case for theories of regionalism. This paper lays out a theoretical appraisal for why more and more industrialized countries join FTAs with emerging markets and illustrates the argument with an analysis of the Japanese case. The paper argues that foreign direct investment (FDI) changes the incentives for states in favour of preferential trade agreements. Increased FDI and shifts in multinational firm strategies increase flows of intermediate goods. As a result, firms lobby their home governments to bolster their competitive position by signing preferential agreements. Yet, FTAs also discriminate against firms from third parties, motivating them to lobby for defensive agreements. The qualitative case studies show how NAFTA discriminates against Japanese FDI in Mexico. As a result, firms began to lobby the Japanese trade bureaucracy, changing the perception of key policymakers who developed a strategy of pursuing preferential trade agreements in the Asia Pacific region, as shown in a case study of the initiative for an FTA with Thailand.
have proliferated rapidly. The WTO counts more than 250 regional trade arrangements, over half of them signed in the last ten years. 1 Recently, Japan has joined the bandwagon.
After adhering to a multilateralist trade policy for over four decades, it concluded its first Japanese government officials offer a third rationale for FTAs: to boost the liberalization of the protected agricultural sector in Japan. 3 In the two existing agreements, however, agriculture was mostly excluded. Indeed, some observers now acknowledge that agricultural reform is a precondition and not a reason for FTAs (Hatakeyama, 2003a; Yamashita, 2004) .
So why did Japan begin to seek bilateral agreements in recent years? This article
argues that Japan's pursuit of FTAs is representative of a broad trend in international economic relations: it reflects the growing importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the sharing of production across borders. FDI changes the incentives for states regarding preferential trade agreements, motivating them to pursue bilateral options in addition to multilateral negotiations. Yet, with the increasing internationalization of production, bilateral agreements also threaten to discriminate against firms from third parties, motivating them to lobby for defensive agreements. According to the argument advanced in this article, Japanese firms with vertically integrated operations in the host country emerge as key supporters of FTAs, in particular when their profits are under threat from FTAs signed by other countries.
In this sense, the explanation given in this paper also differs from recent accounts of the Japanese FTA policy that attribute most of the initiative to Japanese trade bureaucrats (Krauss, 2003; Ogita, 2003) . Trade bureaucrats did matter, I argue, but primarily when responding to pressure from interest groups, especially Japanese firms with overseas investment. The logic of this argument is illustrated with two case studies:
the Japan-Mexico FTA, a defensive reaction against NAFTA, and the Japanese initiative for an FTA with Thailand, a proactive measure.
For two reasons, the Japanese FTA initiatives are challenging cases for the argument. First, compared to the US and European countries, Japan lags in the central measure of international production-sharing: vertical intra-industry trade, 4 or trade in similar goods of different levels of capital-intensity, with regional trade partners (Fukao, et al., 2003) . Second, Japan has a notoriously strong agricultural lobby (George Mulgan, 1999) that should make bilateral agreements with developing countries particularly difficult to achieve. If it can be shown that despite these counteracting factors, lobbying by these Japanese firms was crucial in motivating Japanese policymakers to pursue FTA, then this offers strong support for the central claim of this study.
The aim is not to provide a fully-fledged alternative to existing theories of regionalism. Governments conclude trade agreements for various political reasons, most importantly to support allies (Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Gowa, 1995 In all cases, a fierce political struggle has ensued, allowing for a comparison of the merits of theories of regionalism in the light of the Japanese case.
Current Explanations of Regionalism
In recent theoretical debates, IPE scholars attribute the popularity of regional agreements to two main causes: the slowing of multilateral liberalization efforts, and domestic politics, often revolving around multinational firms and imperfect competition. Milner (1997) proposes that firms in industries characterized by economies of scale will support regional agreements. If firms can expand their market, they can move down the cost curve enough to increase profits, even though the price of their product falls. Milner hypothesizes that increasing returns to scale (IRS) determine an optimal market size, which may be regional but not global (85). Moreover, firms that become more efficient regionally will also be more competitive when exporting beyond the FTA market. This theory explains well why competitive firms with unrealized economies of scale in small markets will support regional liberalization efforts with bigger countries.
But it offers less insight into the motivations of big countries: why would they allow competitors to enter their home market, when they gain only a small market in return?
Likewise, it omits the possibility that production may be relocated. If IRS are firmspecific, then these companies should prefer to export rather than invest. In practice, however, FTAs tend to coincide with considerable increases in FDI.
Chase (2003) addresses these problems and extends the theory in two directions.
First, he points out that IRS matter at the level of the plant rather than the firm. If firms have unrealized IRS that would increase rapidly with growing plant size, these firms will be interested in market expansion through FTAs. Second, regional agreements help solve commitment problems when firms move labour-intensive stages of production abroad.
Firms make highly specific investments, exposing them to a higher risk of disruptions in the production process. FTAs safeguard such international production-sharing. Finally, if production-sharing requires a restructuring of existing operations, then differential tariffphasing in FTAs can be used to temporarily extend protection to incumbent firms (Chase, 2004 One immediate benefit of bilateral agreements is that they allow multinational firms to import parts and machinery from the home into the host country at reduced tariff rates. Often, developing host countries still charge higher most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariffs than developed countries. Reducing this tariff becomes crucial when firms integrate production vertically, whereby the most capital-intensive intermediate goods are
further processed in the export-platform country.
In addition, bilateral trade agreements offer firms a specific benefit over multilateral liberalization: they can generate economic rents. As developing countries liberalize, firms can move labour-intensive stages of production into developing countries, allowing them to produce more efficiently and re-export to the home market.
But since other firms will likewise invest in these countries, competition will rapidly diminish any profits made possible by greater efficiency. Bilateral agreements, however, can be used to restrict access to this benefit of location, if host countries impose a sufficiently high tariff on imports from non-members.
To this end, firms from the home country will try to harness the remaining MFN tariff. They will lobby for strict rules of origin to ensure that goods imported from the In sum, to generate economic rents, FTAs have to incorporate clauses that discriminate against outsiders. FTAs thus become commercial policy instruments to further the competitiveness of multinational firms.
How will this play out in the political arena? Seen through the lens of a political economy framework inspired by Grossman and Helpman (1994), political leaders mainly care about getting re-elected. Trade liberalization affects consumer surplus, producer profits, and tariff revenues. In practical terms, tariff revenues are negligible for developed countries. Lower tariffs benefit consumers by allowing cheaper imports. With the relocation of production to the FTA partner, import prices tend to fall somewhat, because production is more efficient. This benefits the consumer. But because competition is restricted, producer surplus also rises. Bilateral agreements offer a compromise between consumer and producer surplus that appeals to political leaders. Agricultural producers will mount the strongest resistance to bilateral liberalization. FTAs, however, leave much room for the exclusion of sensitive sectors,
given the weak WTO disciplines on preferential agreements. According to Article 24 of the GATT, they should liberalize "substantially all trade," which in practice allows the exclusion of ten per cent of trade or more. If the partner country produces only a few agricultural goods, a deal will indeed be easier to reach than in a multilateral round. FTAs with major agricultural producers, however, should be rare for a country like Japan, and difficult even with small developing countries.
When will the demands of multilateral firms outweigh those of protectionist forces? Most likely only when the competitive pressures warrant great lobbying efforts. Since the discriminatory effect of NAFTA depended on the tariffs applied by the host country, Japanese firms exhausted all possibilities to press the Mexican government for a reduction of these tariffs. At the same time, Japanese firms were most likely aware that a bilateral deal with Mexico was unprecedented and difficult, given the protectionist agricultural sector that had restricted Japan's APEC policy. This strengthens the view of Japan as a challenging case for the argument advanced here and explains why an FTA was only considered much later. For an FTA to become a viable policy, the coalition in favour of trade agreements had to be broadened and advocates in the trade bureaucracy had to be found.
The Conversion of the Japanese Trade Bureaucracy
Despite institutional reforms in Japan, bureaucratic politics remain at the heart of Policy Bureau, various bureaus expressed concern that an extra-regional FTA initiative would send the wrong diplomatic signal for future agreements: The first Japanese FTA ought to be concluded with an Asian neighbour. 13 At the same time, discussions began in MOFA's Economic Affairs Bureau, again set off by consultations with affected Japanese firms. Under Director General Tanaka, a policy paper was prepared that would eventually provide the roadmap for MOFA's pursuit of FTAs. 14 However, there was considerable opposition to bilateral agreements within the Ministry: Multilateralism had served Japan (and the careers of officials trained in international law) well for four decades. 15 After a lengthy process of consensusbuilding, MOFA's new stance was documented by publication of an article by Tanaka (2000) in the monthly magazine Chuuoo Kouron.
In cooperation, METI and MOFA then pursued a strategy that would tackle the ideological and material opposition to FTAs one at a time. To this end, Singapore was selected as the partner for the first bilateral agreement on the grounds that it exported virtually no agricultural products. 16 The first FTA thus had limited political or economic relevance, but provided a template for future negotiations.
Lobbying Around the New Trade Policy
Following the policy shift of MOFA and METI, but facing the still unresolved to carve out the 'sensitive' pork imports into Japan. Using a complex formula, Japan not only limits imports to a quota, but also applies a tariff that brings up the price of Mexican pork to the Japanese 'gate price' guaranteed to domestic farmers. 22 The In comparison, the electronics sector in Thailand is characterized by a much stronger presence of US firms and production networks. Yet, whereas US firms initially sought local low-cost suppliers to produce for re-export to other advanced markets, much Japanese investment served nascent regional markets (Borrus, 1999: 220).
Until the mid-1990s, Japanese investment was thus primarily tariff-jumping, oriented towards host country markets, and put a low emphasis on exports. Yet in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, the conditions for Japanese FDI changed. Slumping demand and trade liberalization begun to affect Japanese production networks, while
Korean and Western firms began to make inroads into previously uncontested markets requested that a further cut in tariff rates be undertaken (…), keeping in mind the materials that cannot be produced in Thailand.
Furthermore, the tariffs on cutting tools ought to be reduced rapidly. countries. Yet, as the case study of the Japan-Mexico FTA shows, it is also a defensive reaction to these policies. Japanese policymakers worried about the effect of other countries' FTAs on the competitiveness of Japanese firms. These concerns, however, did not revolve primarily around exports, but focused on the effects of competitors' FTAs on firm operations in developing countries. 
